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On May 6–7, 1999, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago held its thirty-fifth
annual Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition. Since the early 1960s
the conference has served as a forum
for academics, regulators, and indus-
try participants to debate current issues
affecting the financial services indus-
try. This year’s conference continued
that tradition.
The theme of the conference was
“Global Financial Crises: Their Impli-
cations for the Financial Sector.” Em-
phasis at the conference was placed
on the appropriate means to resolve
problems when they occur, and how to
avoid them in the future. What appears
to have started as a simple currency
devaluation in Thailand in July 1997
has seemingly led to a general upheav-
al in financial markets throughout the
world. Suddenly, global capital market
integration, which had been credited
with enhancing economic growth
through the 1990s, was being criticized
as the major cause of the crises that
have affected well-managed banks and
poorly managed banks alike. Thus, the
unprecedented global financial crises
that followed the collapse of Thai baht
raise numerous public policy questions
which must be addressed to avoid re-
peating past problems. What caused
the recent crises? What role did finan-
cial intermediaries play? Was moral haz-
ard and/or poor regulation an impor-
tant factor? Are most of the problems
behind us? Are current international
regulatory arrangements adequate to
address these problems? Is a new reg-
ulatory architecture needed? Do finan-
cial markets no longer “work” in the
sense that the crises are simply unpre-
dictable and unavoidable? What is the
appropriate public policy response?
To address these and related ques-
tions, the conference held a special
theme session which included Carter
Golembe, president, CHG Consult-
ing, Inc.; John Heimann, chairman,
Financial Stability Institute; Allan H.
Meltzer, professor of political economy,
Carnegie Mellon University; Ernest T.
Patrikis, senior vice president and
general counsel, American Interna-
tional Group, Inc.; and Andrew Sheng
Len Tong, chairman, Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission.
There was also a keynote address by
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, and a luncheon presenta-
tion by Joseph E. Stiglitz, chief econo-
mist of the World Bank, during which
they shared their views on these topics.
Finally, there was an additional session
organized to discuss regulatory reform
during which some of the panel mem-
bers discussed alternative means to
prevent future crises.
In his keynote address, Alan Greenspan
observed that conditions seem to be
improving in the Asian countries most
affected by the recent financial crises.
Further, productivity increases in the
U.S. have served as a buffer against
those crises having a major impact on
the domestic economy. These com-
ments underscored the necessity to
find ways to better manage and to avoid
these problems in the future. In his
luncheon presentation, Mr. Stiglitz
emphasized that the social cost of fi-
nancial crises can be enormous. Even
after financial markets begin to recover,
unemployment rates tend to remain
high for extended periods of time.
There also seems to be a greater im-
pact on less developed countries than
other countries.
The origin of the crises
What caused these crises which start-
ed in Thailand, engulfed Malaysia,
Indonesia and South Korea, and then
proceeded to affect Russia, Brazil, and
Argentina, and some would say now
seems to been influencing financial
activities in Europe? In the theme pan-
el discussion, Andrew Sheng argued
that the Asian crisis was the result of a
classic asset bubble—overleverage and
a boom-bust mentality by investors.
John Heimann echoed this impression.
Mr. Heimann argued that the bubble
was the result of herd behavior by inves-
tors. He felt that those investors who
rushed into Eastern Asia at the begin-
ning of the decade “with scant regard
for risk, bolted in 1997 with scant re-
gard for economic fundamentals.”
Mr. Sheng argued that the major differ-
ence between this and previous crises
was the sheer magnitude of the prob-
lem. For example, in 1996 the total
bank debt in East Asia was some $2.8
trillion, or 130% of gross domestic
product; nearly double that from a
decade before. By 1996, leverage for
the median firm had reached 620%
in South Korea, 340% in Thailand,
and averaged 150% to 200% across
other East Asian countries. This activity
was financed with capital inflows from
other countries, which quickly flowed
away beginning in 1997.
What fueled the bubble? Mr. Stiglitz
stressed the importance of excessive
levels of short-term debt in predicting
the potential for, and severity of, fi-
nancial crises. “In fact, the ability of
this variable by itself to predict the cri-
ses of 1997 is remarkable.” Mr. Sheng,
however, attributed part of the prob-
lem to the new financial industry
landscape. The role of commercial
banks has declined over time while
that of the securities industry has in-
creased. With very limited regulation,
and significant leverage, this nonbank
sector of the industry wields more
influence on financial flows than it
did in the past. The combination ofimproved technical capabilities and
aggressive hedging activities by asset
management funds played a signifi-
cant role in helping fuel the bubble
in East Asia. Bankers added to this
process according to Mr. Heimann.
Bankers relied upon the myth that
emerging markets could continue to
grow at historically high rates. Compet-
itive pressures further encouraged this
herd mentality of pursuing increased
revenues without considering of the
quality of those revenues.
An irresistible force
Then is it a foregone conclusion that
the boom-bust cycle, market “over-
shooting,” and the mentality which
led to these crises are simply the “na-
ture of the beast” and make future cri-
ses inevitable? Not necessarily. Forces
should be in place which would de-
crease the potential for such crises and
decrease their impact when they do
occur. As Mr. Heimann stated, “Strong
financial systems act as stabilizers when
the domestic economy is battered. But
weak systems become magnifiers,
making a bad situation worse.” Allan
Meltzer argued that the magnitude
of the crises was made larger by the
combination of “weak banking sys-
tems, heavily dependent on short-
term foreign loans denominated in
foreign currencies, and pegged ex-
change rates.” In many cases these
weak systems were the result of coun-
try-specific policies including the in-
cursion of politics into the financial
decisionmaking process, inadequate
supervision, opaque and/or mislead-
ing accounting statements, and an in-
adequate legal infrastructure to
determine property rights and to vali-
date contracts. As Mr. Meltzer stated,
“Russia does not have the rule of law,
private property, a solvent banking sys-
tem, transparent accounting, or most
other requirements for a functioning
market system.” When financial prob-
lems developed, “the prudent action
for a lender was to get his assets out,
salvage what could be saved, and hold
hard currency.”
At the center of these financial crises
were institutions whose liabilities
were perceived as having an implicit
government guarantee, but were essen-
tially unregulated and thus subjected
to severe moral hazard problems. An-
ticipation of protection from losses
provides incentives for institutions to
engage in excessively risky investments.
According to Charles Calomiris, pro-
fessor of finance and economics at
Columbia University, “the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s willingness to
assist in bailing out international banks
and failed domestic banks—first in
Mexico and later in Asia—has played
a tangible role in encouraging exces-
sive risk-taking.” It has long been
known that financial intermediaries
who have access to implicit or explicit
government liability guarantees pose
a serious problem of moral hazard. The
U.S. savings and loan debacle is the
classic example. Due to the moral haz-
ard problem, governments generally
reserve the right to monitor, place asset
restrictions, and impose capital require-
ments on their financial institutions.
Unfortunately, it was argued by Mr.
Calomiris, this monitoring function
was not performed effectively in many
Asian countries. Since many creditors
perceived that their funds were pro-
tected by implicit or explicit govern-
ment guarantees, creditors (both
foreign financial institutions and
domestic lenders) did not monitor
the firms in which they invested, nor
impose discipline on the use of their
funds. If regulatory restrictions or cov-
enants are not imposed, then institu-
tions will undertake excessively risky
investments. The provision of implicit
or explicit government liability guar-
antees not only encourages excessively
risky investment, but also distorts capi-
tal flows and market prices. According
to Mr. Meltzer “it encourages the short-
term capital flows that the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund protects at the
expense of other types of investments.”
Mr. Calomiris noted that “anticipations
of protection from losses not only
prompt intentional risk-taking, they
also undermine the information con-
tent of market prices as a signal of risk,
thereby making more likely that inves-
tors will unwittingly misallocate capital.”
For example, rating agencies such as
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s pro-
vide an ongoing assessment of credit
risk in emerging markets. Only many
weeks after the crisis had begun did
these rating agencies downgrade long-
term sovereign debt of Asia countries,
a point also echoed by Mr. Stiglitz.
Theoretically, capital requirements
can be used to control moral hazard.
However, Mr. Sheng argued that the
8% minimum capital requirement
imposed by Basle was extremely in
adequate given the level of risk as-
sumed in these countries. In fact, for
many Asian economies the bank capi-
tal ratios were almost impossible to
interpret because there was a general
absence of clear loan-classification
standards, asset valuation, and provi-
sioning rules.
Mr. Heimann, Mr. Patrikis, and Mr.
Sheng were particularly vocal in their
criticism of risk management systems
and highlighted them as a cause of
the crises. Investors were generally
seen as being overly exuberant and
being too willing to invest in small and
illiquid markets. Borrowers underesti-
mated the risk of running large matu-
rity and exchange rate mismatches.
Regulators and policy setters failed
to understand the inconsistencies in
their monetary and exchange rate pol-
icies. Finally, rating agencies and inter-
national banks failed to understand
the interrelated capital flows and bank-
ing relationships. Mr. Heimann saw
the risk management issues as being
particularly problematic in less devel-
oped countries and suggested that
policy changes were necessary to alter
the incentives faced by banks in these
countries and perhaps tighten the con-
straints under which they must operate.
Are new capital standards needed?
Both Mr. Patrikis and Mr. Stiglitz dis-
cussed the potential role of current
capital adequacy standards in exacer-
bating the crises. The standards fail
to account for certain correlations,
including those between market and
credit risk, and as a result may distort
the capital allocation process. For ex-
ample, because short-term loans are
typically thought to have less credit
risk, the Basle capital rules weight
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outside the OECD countries at 20%
if the claims have a residual maturity
of less than one year, and at 100% if
they have a residual maturity exceed-
ing a year. This encouraged short-term
lending by banks in developed coun-
tries. Borrowers, seeing the lower rates,
borrowed more short term. The effect
was an accumulation of large debt re-
payments in any given year. Mr. Patrikis
gave an example in which he argued
that the Basle risk weights indicated
that it was safer to lend to a Korean
bank than it was to lend to one of the
major Korean industrial conglomer-
ates. A loan to the Korean conglomer-
ate would incur a 100% weight capital
charge while the loan to the bank
would be at 20%. If a bank director
was asked why they extended so much
credit to Korean banks, they could ar-
gue it was because official position was
that the loans were much less risky.
“We did what our supervisor said.”
These and other shortcomings of the
Basle standards have been recognized
and are currently under review.
A discouraging element of the discus-
sion was the realization that most of
the inadequacies discussed here were
well recognized. Market participants
knew that the reliability of market in-
formation was poor, that supervisory
systems in many cases were essentially
nonexistent, and that there was little
in the way of transparency or disclo-
sure. As Mr. Heimann emphasized,
“Market participants knew the vulner-
abilities, but ignored them.” One could
argue that we have not learned very
much from the past. Perhaps it takes
a crisis of this magnitude to spur politi-
cians and central bankers to put appro-
priate measures in place for crisis
management and prevention.  Accord-
ing to Mr. Meltzer, “one lesson to be
drawn from this experience is the need
to improve the safety and soundness
of banking systems.”
Is there a need for an improved
regulatory architecture?
What are those improvements? What
form, if any, should regulatory reform
take? There were a wide range of views
on this issue. At one end of the spec-
trum, Mr. Heimann argued that there
was no need for a new regulatory
architecture. Rather, we need to
“better enforce the basic nuts and
bolts of financial supervision.” What
is needed is a strong, independent
supervisory system augmented with
internationally accepted accounting
standards which accurately portray
the condition of financial institutions,
improved transparency and disclo-
sure, and improved communication
of information between regulators
across borders. He emphasized the
role of the newly created Financial
Stability Institute which has a general
mandate to improve the quality of su-
pervision in developing countries.
Others wanted more structured
change. For example, Mr. Calomiris
and Mr. Meltzer recommended that
International Monetary Fund lending
be restricted to crisis lending for
countries that have sound banking
systems. According to Mr. Meltzer,
the criteria for soundness would in-
clude the requirements “1) that pri-
vate lenders, mainly financial insti-
tutions, must accept the risk that a
bank will fail by holding uninsured
claims, and 2) foreign banks should
be permitted to compete in local
markets to reduce risk by diversifica-
tion.” If firms engage in risky activities,
then uninsured creditors will require
compensation in the form of a higher
return on their funds for bearing the
increased risk. As a result, the willing-
ness of firms to invest in risky projects
will be held in check by the concern
of creditors for the safety of their
funds, and this can foster a sound
banking system. Mr. Calomiris agreed,
stating that “market discipline would
be a lever for other reforms, particu-
larly in disclosure, accounting, com-
mercial law, and bankruptcy law.
Without market discipline, and the
incentives it provides to produce and
use information, disclosure require-
ments will not make a difference. With
market discipline, a strong constitu-
ency for additional improvements in
accounting and commercial law will
be created.”
Mr. Golembe would like to focus the
public policy debate in the U.S. on
the appropriate regulatory structure
for banks and other financial institu-
tions. He stressed that sweeping, almost
revolutionary, changes taking place in
the financial services industry are forc-
ing countries to reform their existing
regulatory structure. According to Mr.
Golembe, the most prominent of these
reform efforts “has been the creation
in Britain of the new Financial Services
Authority, which has been given respon-
sibility for the authorization, supervision,
and regulation of effectively all forms
of financial services activity in the UK,
including banks.” Mr. Golembe argued
that “the increased interest in finding
better ways to deal with international
crises is likely to force a resolution of
an urgent issue in the United States:
reform of the regulatory structure, in-
cluding determination of the appropri-
ate role, if any, for the Federal Reserve
System in the supervision and regula-
tion of banks.”
Finally, it is generally argued among
economists that, by far, the major cause
of financial crisis is an unstable econo-
my. This results in deteriorating asset
quality, asset price bubbles, and wide
swings in asset prices and exchange
rates which can lead to systemwide
problems. Thus, it is not surprising
that the effectiveness of monetary policy
was raised as an issue. Mr. Meltzer exam-
ined the spread between the interest



















































































































































































































































bills (paper–bill) to determine how
the world’s money markets reacted to
these financial crises and how the U.S.
monetary policy reactions compared
to those in other periods of financial
stress. “Widening spreads between
commercial paper and Treasury bill
rates is typical in periods of uncertainty
and market stress,” he said. He showed
that, following the Russian default in
mid-August and the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management in October
of last year, the U.S. experienced a
much larger increase in the paper–
bill spread than Germany, Japan, and
the UK. One possible explanation for
these differences is that the U.S. re-
ceived a large capital inflow from those
seeking safety in U.S. government se-
curities which put downward pressure
on interest rates in those markets.
“Commercial paper rates did not rise.
They just declined much less than
Treasury bill rates,” said Mr. Meltzer.
To determine the relative importance
of the 1997–98 crisis, Mr. Meltzer com-
pared the behavior of the paper–bill
spread during this period with that
during three other periods of financial
stress: the commercial paper crisis in
1970 (following the default by Penn
Central Railroad, a large commercial
paper issuer); the 1973–74 oil crisis;
and the October 1987 stock market
crash. During each of these distur-
bances the paper–bill spread rose pri-
marily because rates moved in opposite
directions. However, the most recent
disturbance showed both the commer-
cial paper rate and the Treasury bill
rate falling at different rates of change.
Mr. Meltzer argued that there was
much less flight from commercial
paper during the most recent crisis
than in the earlier periods, and capital
inflows and increases in bank reserves
pushed down all short-term rates,
especially Treasury bill rates. “The
Federal Reserve was correct to respond
promptly to the increased demand for
liquidity,” he said.
Now that the global financial crisis
atmosphere of 1997–98 has passed,
analysts and policymakers can take
inventory of the events surrounding
these problems. The 1999 Bank Struc-
ture Conference provided an oppor-
tunity for scholars and practitioners to
begin to put the recent crises into per-
spective, suggesting the appropriate
responses to prevent such crises in
the future. Planning for the 2000
conference, scheduled for May 3–5,
is currently underway.
—Elijah Brewer III
Assistant vice president
—Douglas D. Evanoff
Senior financial economist
and vice president